On the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness

Some proponents of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness profess strong views on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC), namely that large swathes of the neocortex, cerebellum, basal ganglia, thalamus, olfactory bulb, and the so-called limbic system, are all not essential for any form of conscious experiences. We argue that this claim derives from a strong version of the theory, according to which the NCC is supposed to constitute conscious experiences. On a weaker version of the theory, IIT only provides what we call a marker of consciousness. We surmise that a conflation between strong and weak versions of the theory has led these researchers to adopt definitions of NCC that are inconsistent with their own previous definitions, inadvertently betraying the promises of an otherwise fruitful empirical endeavour.