Abstract
This paper analyzes a taking project which has recently come to the fore of public attention in Korea. Hypotheses as to why some ostensibly unreasonable incidents have occurred during this project will be presented. Also, starting with a general government incentive to maximize the discretionary budget, a theoretical reasoning will be developed to formally establish the hypotheses. The major features of taking focused on are the endogeneity of the takings probability and the government's opportunistic use of announcement effects. The paper seeks to explain various phenomena that tend to emerge when the compensation rule and taking procedure are superficially established, thereby fostering a political game whereby the resident's resistance deviates the taking probability from the efficient one.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 331-346 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | International Review of Law and Economics |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 2002 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Announcement effect
- Discretionary budget
- Due process
- Endogenous taking probability
- Opportunism
- Takings